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NO CIVILIZED
SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
Sonja R. West∗
Reviewing
CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION
(Henry Holt 2008)

T

the Supreme Court’s 2000 case
of United States v. Morrison1 are well known to most Court
watchers. Christy Brzonkala was an 18-year-old college
freshman at Virginia Tech when she claims she was gang
raped by two members of the school’s varsity football team. The
attack left Brzonkala severely depressed and suicidal.
She turned to her state for recourse. After being assured by
school officials that they believed her account, Brzonkala filed an
administrative complaint against her attackers under Virginia Tech’s
sexual assault policy. But after forcing her to testify at two hearings
– during which one of the players, Antonio Morrison, admitted to
having sex with her after she twice told him “no” – the state school
offered Brzonkala no remedy for her injuries. Both players were
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allowed to return to school without punishment (one kept his fullride scholarship).2 Brzonkala, meanwhile, dropped out of school.
She later reported the crime to state authorities but a grand jury
investigation failed to produce any indictments.3 The state system,
under anyone’s definition, failed to protect Brzonkala’s civil rights.
So Brzonkala next looked to her federal government for redress.
She sued the two men under a section of the federal Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”)4 that provides a private
cause of action against any “person … who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender.”5 The case wound its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the majority opinion written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court never disputed Brzonkala’s
allegations and recognized that, if true, she was clearly “the victim
of a brutal assault.”6 Nonetheless, the Court held that Congress
lacked the power to pass the VAWA’s private cause of action provision. Our system of federalism, Rehnquist stated, requires that any
remedy to Brzonkala “must be provided by the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and not by the United States.”7
2

3

4

5
6
7

Brief for Petitioner at 4-6, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. Morrison was found guilty of
sexual assault. The school, however, without notice or explanation to Brzonkala,
later lowered the charges from “sexual assault” to “using abusive language.” Later,
again without notice to Brzonkala, the school set Morrison’s punishment aside
entirely. Id. After being indicted on charges of rape and attempted sodomy of
another student, the other player, James Crawford, pleaded guilty to the lesser
charge of attempted aggravated sexual assault. Although he was sentenced to
twelve months in prison, the sentencing court later suspended the entire sentence
and placed him on “unsupervised probation.” Id. at 5, n.2.
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v.
Morrison, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 135, 140 (2000). Brzonkala did not initially pursue
state criminal charges against the men because she believed the lack of physical
evidence from the rape would doom her case. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst.
& State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
42 § 13981(c).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
Id.
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In a striking moment, however, Rehnquist concluded by observing that the brutality of the attack on Brzonkala demanded a governmental response. “If the allegations here are true,” he declared,
“no civilized system of justice could fail to provide her a remedy for
the conduct of respondent Morrison.”8 It was a remarkable statement given that the state system in this case had done just that – left
Brzonkala without a remedy. The federal government had attempted to step in and correct the state’s egregious failure, but the
Court had put a stop to it. The Court’s decision thus left the job of
protecting certain constitutional rights solely with the states. Unfortunately, this kind of hopeful reliance on the states to do the right
thing has a proven history of being a poor path to a “civilized system
of justice.”

U

SEE ALSO UNITED STATES V. CRUIKSHANK

nited States v. Morrison is most frequently discussed as a case
about Congress’s constantly changing Commerce Clause powers. But the Court in Morrison gave the VAWA’s private action a
one-two punch: first concluding it was unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause and then also finding it failed under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the latter holding, the Court found that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action and provides no
protection against private conduct “however discriminatory or
wrongful.”9 In support of this finding, the Court in Morrison provided a long “see also” string citation. Last on the list of referenced
cases stood a little known case from more than a century earlier –
United States v. Cruikshank.10
The Court quoted Cruikshank for the proposition that
“[t]he fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one
citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional
8

Id.
Id. at 621 (quotations omitted).
10
92 U.S. 542 (1876).
9
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guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the
fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society.”11

Nowhere in the Court’s discussion of Cruikshank did the Court acknowledge that it was relying favorably on a case in which it had set
free the perpetrators of one of the bloodiest race-based massacres in
American history – the Colfax Massacre of 1873. Indeed a thorough
reading of Cruikshank itself fails to reveal that the case arose out of a
murderous rampage committed by a mob of white supremacists
who gunned down more than sixty unarmed black men as they fled
a burning courthouse while waving flags of surrender. If little is
known about the events leading up to the Supreme Court’s Cruikshank decision, perhaps even less is known about the legal ramifications of that case. Ramifications that – as the Morrison case illustrates
– have followed us into the twenty-first century.
This is where Charles Lane comes in.
In his new book, The Day Freedom Died,12 Lane, the Washington
Post’s Supreme Court reporter from 2000 to 2006 (he is now an
editorial writer for the paper), dives deep into the Colfax Massacre
and the Cruikshank case that rose from its ashes. Through riveting
narrative, he expertly pieces together what happened on Easter
Sunday, 1873, in the small town of Colfax, Louisiana. Step by step
he debunks the initial reports that a violent mob of armed black
men had overthrown the local government and seized the town’s
courthouse. According to those stories, relayed by white residents
of Colfax, the white men were acting in self-defense when they
formed a posse and, after attempts at a truce failed, smoked the
black men out of the courthouse. It was this version of events that
persisted well into the next century.13 Lane sets the record straight
11

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622 (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554).
Charles Lane, The Day Freedom Died (Henry Holt 2008).
13
In 1950, for example, the state of Louisiana erected a seven-foot-tall historic
marker at the site of the courthouse that claimed that the “Colfax Riot” was
noteworthy because it allegedly “marked the end of carpetbag misrule in the
South.” Id. at 260.
12
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by carefully weaving together the facts that led up to the bloody
debacle. The truth, Lane’s readers learn, is a story of hatred, violence and racial discrimination. It also is a story of our dual system
of government – both its potential and its failures.
The story that Lane builds is of a particular town that, like the
entire nation, had been torn apart by the Civil War. More than a
decade had gone by since the Emancipation Proclamation, and the
United States government was still struggling to honor its many
promises of Reconstruction. Three new constitutional amendments
provided a hopeful start: the Thirteenth abolished slavery, the Fourteenth made former slaves United States citizens and guaranteed
them basic equality, and the Fifteenth secured the right to vote for
black men. Relying on new powers granted by these Amendments,
Congress began passing a series of civil rights laws, including the
Enforcement Act of 1870, which made racial terrorism a federal
offense.
To the black residents of Colfax, Louisiana, however, the promise of equality embodied in these laws must have seemed elusive and
shadowy. As Lane tells it, the pro-Reconstruction Republicans of
Colfax had every rightful claim to the local judgeship and sheriff’s
office, but virulent white supremacists insisted that their men had
been elected to these positions and used fraudulent commissions to
get sworn into office. Both groups knew that control of the town
hinged on control of the local courthouse. A group of mostly black
Republicans successfully entered the courthouse building in the
middle of the night, claiming the contested offices and the political
power that went with it as their own. What followed was a threeweek standoff during which the white supremacists assembled a
posse of former Confederate soldiers. After the Republican occupiers refused to yield, the posse fired on the black men holed up in
the courthouse, even putting to use a small cannon. The occupiers
held on until the posse turned to a new deadly tactic. They set fire
to the courthouse and shot the black men as they ran for their lives
– many waving white flags of surrender. Those who weren’t killed
on the spot were taken prisoner, only to be executed a short time
later. In the end, Lane estimates that between sixty-two and eightySUMMER 2008
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one black men were murdered. The three white men who died that
day were likely the victims of friendly fire.
Lane next turns his focus to the quest for justice for the victims.
State efforts to prosecute failed quickly. A Louisiana district attorney managed to obtain indictments but was then met by an armed
white mob angry over the attempt to prosecute. Left without any
protection to help him enforce state law, the district attorney fled
and the state indictments withered.
The only hope now lay with the federal government and a
young, idealistic prosecutor named James Beckwith who had the
radical idea that murderers of black victims should receive the same
punishment as murderers of whites. After learning of the events in
Colfax, Beckwith initiated what would become a long and historic
attempt to bring the perpetrators of the Colfax Massacre to justice.
He began by indicting 97 men on 32 counts of violating the Enforcement Act. With frustratingly little support from Washington,
he was able to bring only nine men to trial. The initial proceeding
produced a mistrial, with jurors split down racial lines. In the follow-up trial, Beckwith presented a string of testimony from mostly
black witnesses who testified to the events of that bloody Sunday
and directly identified the defendants as murderers. In the end, the
jury convicted three of the men on the lesser charge of conspiracy –
a violation of section 6 of the Enforcement Act. To Beckwith and
the black community of Colfax, this verdict was a watered-down
but real vindication. To most of white Louisiana it was a shocking
indignation.
It was now time for the Supreme Court to get involved.

“SORRY FOR THE ‘DRED’”
Joseph Philo Bradley, who was riding the federal circuits of
Justice
the Deep South, happened to be in New Orleans when the second
Cruikshank trial began. Following the practice at the time, he sat in
on some early motions including a defense challenge to the constitutionality of the Enforcement Act, the statutory basis for the convictions. Justice Bradley postponed ruling on the motion, ordered
the trial to continue and then left town. But after hearing news of
526
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the verdicts against the three white men he made the long journey
back to the Crescent City to rule on the defense’s motion. Lawyers
for the white defendants had argued that Congress did not have the
power to pass the Enforcement Act under the Fourteenth Amendment, which declares only that “no state” can infringe rights of life,
liberty and property. According to the defense, the Amendment did
not speak at all about acts committed by individuals so that the duty
to punish such “personal aggression” remained solely with the state
and not the federal government. Justice Bradley agreed.
The Fourteenth Amendment, Bradley explained, does not give
Congress the power to pass laws for the punishment “of murder,
false imprisonment, robbery or any other crime committed by individual malefactors.”14 Rather, he reasoned, it only allows Congress
to protect individuals from “arbitrary and unjust” action by the
state.15 Congress, therefore, could pass legislation to protect the
black men of Colfax from official violation of their civil liberties,
but it was powerless to protect them from a violent racist mob.
Based on this reasoning, the section of the Enforcement Act under
which the Cruikshank defendants had been convicted was unconstitutional.16 The guilty verdicts, Justice Bradley ruled, had to be overturned.
The case went to the Supreme Court for a ruling on the constitutional question. While the case lingered on the Court’s docket,
white supremacist violence erupted across the South as the Bradley
opinion was seen as giving a green light for race-based attacks. After
nearly a year of deliberation and drafting, a unanimous Court
agreed with Justice Bradley’s lower court decision.17 Chief Justice
Waite delivered the opinion of the Court, which parroted much of
Justice Bradley’s reasoning. The Cruikshank defendants were ac14

Id. at 206.
Id.
16
Justice Bradley further held that even if the Act were constitutional, the indictment charging the men was flawed because it did not allege that the acts were
committed for racially discriminatory reasons. Id. at 209-210.
17
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.
15
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cused, Waite contended, of “nothing else than alleging a conspiracy
to falsely imprison or murder.”18 The Constitution did not give the
federal government the power to punish crimes like these, because
the Fourteenth Amendment “adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.”19 The Court handed down its ruling without
acknowledging that it was setting free three men who had been
convicted of participating in a racially inspired mass murder.
More than a century later, Chief Justice Rehnquist would remark that “no civilized system of government” would deny Christy
Brzonkala a remedy for her injuries even though Virginia had done
just that. In Cruikshank, Chief Justice Waite made a similar – if also
unintentional – critique of Louisiana when he stated that “[e]very
republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in
the enjoyment of [their civil liberties], if within its power.”20 But
like Rehnquist in Morrison, Waite also seemed indifferent about
whether the state had actually fulfilled that duty. Waite’s concern,
rather, was whether the federal government had any power to act
against private wrongdoers when the states failed. He concluded
that it did not. “The only obligation resting upon the United States
is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment
guarantees, but no more.”21
Lane’s book illustrates superbly why the Court’s decision was so
devastating to Reconstruction’s goals of equality. Across the South,
white supremacists were engaging in a widespread campaign of personal terror aimed at denying black citizens their rights of equal
treatment and due process. State governments, meanwhile, lacked
either the will or the power to offer protection. The Court’s decision thus allowed private mobs to assail their African-American fellow citizens at will. These racist groups were sending their black
neighbors a clear and chilling message that the penalty for political

18

Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
20
Id. at 555.
21
Id.
19
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participation – whether it was by seeking to vote, standing for election or assuming office once elected – was death.
Lane tells an anecdote where a friend of Chief Justice Waite’s
half-jokingly referred to the Cruikshank decision as comparable to
the Court’s infamous Dred Scott opinion. “Sorry for the ‘Dred,’”
Lane reports that Waite replied, “but to my mind there was no escape.”22

T

A SHIELD AGAINST ANARCHY
AS WELL AS TYRANNY

he decision from which Chief Justice Waite could find no escape thus joined the ranks of the Court’s Reconstruction Era
cases, many of which are far better known than Cruikshank. The
Slaughter-House Cases, for example, gutted the “privileges or immunities” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving Congress and
future Supreme Courts to turn to other clauses, such as the Equal
Protection Clause, to battle discriminatory laws.23 In United States v.
Harris the Court followed Cruikshank by holding that the Ku Klux
Klan Act was unconstitutional because Congress could not punish
the private acts of a lynch mob.24 And in the Civil Rights Cases Justice
Bradley declared that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited racial discrimination by private persons in the operation of public accommodations.25 The Reconstruction Amendments, he reasoned, did not give Congress any power
to legislate “what may be called the social rights of and races in the
community.”26 He famously added that the time had come for former slaves to “take[] the rank of a mere citizen, and cease[] to be the
special favorite of the laws.”27
22

Lane, supra note 12, at 247.
83 U.S. 36 (1873).
24
106 U.S. 629 (1883).
25
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
26
Id. at 30.
27
Id. at 25. This holding was in stark contrast to a dissenting opinion Justice Bradley
wrote a decade earlier in which he observed that “[m]erely striking off the fetters
23
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When the Morrison case arrived at the Supreme Court in the beginning of the year 2000, the case of a brutal rape of a college student might not have seemed to have much in common with the
nineteenth century actions of a murderous racist mob. But the fights
to obtain justice for Christy Brzonkala and the victims of the Colfax
Massacre have many things in common. In both cases the states
proved to be either unable or unwilling to provide a remedy even if
they were “duty bound” to do so and if any “civilized system of justice” would demand it. And in both cases Congress had concluded
that it was necessary for the federal government to fill the void and
secure the constitutional rights that the states had allowed to be
trampled. The Supreme Court, moreover, was the final arbiter in
both cases, and in each of them declared that Congress was helpless
to act even in the face of violent and still unremedied acts of classbased discrimination.
In Cruikshank, the Justices were faced with two competing and
prominent views of Congress’s power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. They could have sided with the opinion of the Cruikshank trial judge – the Honorable William Burham Woods then of
the Fifth Circuit but who later would himself be elevated to the Supreme Court by President Hayes. In a prior case, Judge Woods had
concluded that the federal government could protect individuals not
only from discriminatory state laws but also from “state inaction, or
incompetency.”28 In other words, if a state government failed to
adequately protect the civil rights of its citizens, the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to step in and fill the void.
As Lane explains, “[a]ccording to Woods, the Fourteenth Amendment was a shield against anarchy as well as tyranny.”29 But the
Cruikshank Court instead adopted the far more restrictive view of
Justice Bradley.
of the slave, without removing the incidents and consequences of slavery, would
hardly have been a boon to the colored race.” Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581,
601 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
28
United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871).
29
Lane, supra note 12, at 115.
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In United States v. Morrison, the Solicitor General advanced an argument that closely tracked the reasoning of Judge Woods. According to the Solicitor General, Congress had the power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to pass the VAWA in order to address
gender-motivated crime because the states were not doing so effectively. Congress had found that the states were “routinely treat[ing]
violent crimes motivated by gender less seriously than other violent
crimes,”30 and that “the States’ own effort to eliminate such bias had
not succeeded and required federal assistance.”31 This finding, even
Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted, was “supported by a voluminous
congressional record.”32 The four dissenters in Morrison agreed with
the Solicitor General that the Fourteenth Amendment allowed
Congress to provide a private remedy to make up for the states’
failure. “But why can Congress not provide a remedy against private
actors?” Justice Breyer asked in dissent.33 The statutory remedy “intrudes very little upon either States or private parties. It may lead
state actors to improve their own remedial systems, primarily
through example.”34
In large numbers, the states themselves agreed with the result
advocated by the dissenters. The attorneys general for thirty-six
states plus the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed an amicus brief
in Morrison urging the Court to uphold the VAWA. They told the
Court that the VAWA’s civil remedy provision “complements state
and local efforts to combat violence against women without in any
way compromising those efforts, it does not undermine federalism.”35 Only one state, Alabama, argued in favor of Morrison.
But Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by four other justices, rejected the argument that Congress may act when the states
“through discriminatory design or the discriminatory conduct of
30

Brief for the United States at 37, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
Id. at 42.
32
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620.
33
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34
Id. (quotations omitted).
35
Brief of the States of Arizona, et al. at 21, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
31
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their officials”36 fail to do so. According to Rehnquist, the “language
and purpose” of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress no
power to raise a “‘shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.’”37 Thus thanks to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Morrison, Justice Souter argued, “the States will be
forced to enjoy the new federalism whether they want it or not.”38
In support for the majority’s ruling, Rehnquist quoted the legislative record from the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 and 1875. In passing these laws, he argued, it was clear that Congress hoped to provide protection to former slaves in situations where the states were
refusing to enforce nearly identical laws on their books. This was
analogous to Congress’s goals with the VAWA. Thus, he argued, if
the Supreme Court found the Civil Rights Acts unconstitutional it
followed that the VAWA must be unconstitutional as well.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on the legislative record of the
Civil Rights Acts passed during Reconstruction is perplexing considering another argument he made in favor of upholding Cruikshank, Harris and the Civil Rights Cases. He contended that
[t]he force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions stems not only from the length of time they have been
on the books, but also from the insight attributable to the
Members of the Court at that time. Every Member had
been appointed by President Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur – and each of their judicial appointees obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the
events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.39

In other words, the Court should defer to the Justices who decided
the Reconstruction Era cases because they had more insight into the
true purpose behind the Fourteenth Amendment. They were there,

36

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 620, 621 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 3 and n.12 (1948)).
38
Id. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
39
Id. at 622.
37
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after all, and thus better able to discern the intentions of the framers of these Amendments.
It is perhaps this argument that Lane’s book is most helpful in
debunking in two ways. The first is through Lane’s depiction of the
Supreme Court Justices simply as human beings who were as affected by the tumultuous events surrounding them as anyone else.
These were men who were products of their time, which Lane
paints as a shockingly and overtly racist era. When Cruikshank came
before the Court, much of the country was suffering what today’s
media likely would label “Reconstruction fatigue.” The nation in
1873 was turning its attention toward economic issues and away
from the plight of the former slaves. According to Lane, the members of the Supreme Court were as disillusioned with Reconstruction as many other white citizens. Two of the Justices were Democrats who likely had little sympathy for the former slaves or for Republican policies. But even among the pro-Lincoln Republicans on
the bench, most were concerned more with the preservation of the
union than with the equality of the races. And while several of the
Justices, including Justice Bradley, had written eloquently about the
importance of equality among the races, Lane shows how their actions, both on the bench and off, rarely lived up to their ringing
words. It is difficult to read Lane’s portrayal and conclude that the
Court should defer blindly to the views of these Justices as to what
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies simply because they were
there.
Lane’s book further exposes the flaws in Rehnquist’s deference
to the Cruikshank Justices’ front-row view of the Fourteenth
Amendment by offering insight into what the actual drafters of the
Amendment likely believed. Rehnquist relied on the views of these
Justices because they were alive during the drafting and ratification
of the Reconstruction Amendments, but the more relevant testimony surely can be found in the words of those who actually had a
hand in creating them. In Cruikshank, Attorney General George
Williams argued before the Court in favor of Congress’s power to
pass the Enforcement Act. Unlike any of the Justices, Williams had
been a sitting senator during the enactment of the post-Civil War
SUMMER 2008
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Amendments and participated actively in their passage. He pointed
out to the Court that virtually the same legislators who had drafted
and passed the Amendments had also drafted and passed the civil
rights legislation that followed, including the Enforcement Act. The
Court must remember, he told the Justices,
that these amendments and the legislation under them were
practically made by the same hands. Is it to be supposed
that those who drew the amendments did not know their
scope? According to the arguments on the other side it
must be assumed of the Senators and Representatives either
that they violated their oath or that they did not know the
meaning of the language which they used themselves.40

Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Morrison offers support
for the position staked out by George Williams. In particular,
Rehnquist cites the statement of Representative Garfield in the
House who argued that federal legislation to protect the former
slaves was necessary because state laws suffered from “a systematic
maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their
provisions.”41 In sum, historical evidence suggests that those who
truly had “intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment” – members
of the Congress that brought it into being – believed that the
Amendment empowered Congress to right constitutional wrongs
when the states, through overt action or blatant inaction, failed to
do so.

L

HI

ane ends his book with a wistful epilogue of what might have
been had the Supreme Court gone the other way in Cruikshank.
With that decision, Lane contends, the United States lost its best
chance at creating “the world’s first true interracial democracy.”42
He points to the “unpunished slaughter” in Colfax and the “narrow40

Lane, supra note 12, at 241.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625.
42
Lane, supra note 12, at 251.
41
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ing of federal law enforcement” in the Cruikshank decision as key
constitutional milestones.43 They were part of a regression of civil
liberties that would continue to grow exponentially. It would take
the Supreme Court a century to begin to undo the damage.
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court had
another opportunity to allow the Fourteenth Amendment to fulfill
essential promises that were first made and broken during Reconstruction. Christy Brzonkala and the Colfax Massacre victims were
all brutally targeted – one because of her gender and the others because of their race. The United States Constitution guarantees individuals protection from such violence, or at least affords Congress
the power to provide a remedy for their injuries. Yet in both of
these cases, their states failed to act for discriminatory reasons. The
Constitution of 2000, like the Constitution of 1873, does not simply abandon its citizens when their civil rights are harmed in this
manner. Rather, one of the beauties of our system of federalism is
that it provides not one but two opportunities for a truly civilized
system of justice.

43

Id.
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